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Notes
“FREEDOM OF” OR “FREEDOM FROM”?
THE ENFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACTS AND
THE INTEGRITY OF THE LLC
LEIGH A. BACON
INTRODUCTION
The sudden growth of limited liability company (LLC)
legislation in the past ten years has been accompanied by a
corresponding amount of scholarship dedicated to the logistics,
concerns, and implications of the limited liability company.1 Most
legal scholarship has examined the potential liability and the scope of
the fiduciary duty of the members of an LLC.2 At issue in this Note is
not the extent to which the members of an LLC owe duties to it or to
each other but rather the extent to which the LLC is independent of
its members. LLC legislation and case law expressly serve the
principles of freedom of contract. Preserving the freedom of members

Copyright © 2001 by Leigh A. Bacon.
1. The limited liability company and the limited liability partnership (LLP) are both
alternative business entities. The LLC provides limited liability to its members as well as the
favorable pass-through tax treatment generally reserved for partnerships. Robert R. Keatinge et
al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 BUS. LAW. 375, 380
(1992). The LLP, meanwhile, preserves partnership tax treatment and proves a degree of
limited liability for general partners as well as limited partners. Wayne M. Gazur, The Limited
Liability Company Experiment: Unlimited Flexibility, Uncertain Role, 58 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 135, 168-69 (Spring 1995).
2. E.g., Richard A. Booth, Fiduciary Duty, Contract, and Waiver in Partnerships and
Limited Liability Companies, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 55, 55 (1997) (advocating a
flexible approach to the fiduciary duty of LLC members); William H. Copperthwaite, Jr.,
Limited Liability Companies: The Choice for the Future, 103 COM. L.J. 222, 236-37 (1998)
(evaluating the benefits of the LLC form and noting that “the LLC organized in one state is
constitutionally entitled to enter other states for purposes of interstate commerce, and those
other states may not enact laws which unduly burden the LLCs ability to engage in interstate
commerce”); Gazur, supra note 1, at 160-62 (discussing which fiduciary standards are
appropriate by reviewing the various LLC management scenarios).
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to contract with one another as to the operation of the LLC, however,
can occur at the expense of the LLC.
The law recognizes the LLC as an entity that has protected
rights, at least for some purposes.3 This Note examines whether this
status implies that, when executing agreements, the members of an
LLC do not bind the LLC itself. It argues that courts should consider
the separate entity characteristics of an LLC when considering
whether to enforce against it an agreement to which it is not a party.
Part I introduces two recent holdings that advance opposite
conclusions as to whether an LLC should be bound by an arbitration
and choice-of-forum clause in its operating agreement when it was
not itself a signatory to the agreement. It then examines what effect
the policies favoring arbitration have on the enforceability of
arbitration clauses and argues that, notwithstanding freedom-ofcontract principles, an arbitration clause should not be enforced
against a nonparty, even where that nonparty is an LLC. Part II
suggests that comparing the LLC to the corporation might be more
appropriate than comparing it to the partnership, and applies
citizenship and internal-affairs-doctrine analyses to the LLC to
demonstrate that the LLC can be considered a separate entity whose
interests should be balanced against freedom-of-contract principles.
Part III proposes that while providing for freedom of contract in LLC
agreements might attract would-be members to form an LLC in a
state that exalts such freedom in its LLC legislation, a state court
system’s refusal to respect the independence of an LLC might counter
any such lure. The Note concludes that freedom of contract does not
necessarily justify enforcing a contract against an LLC when it is not a
party to the contract and that enforcement of such a contract could
harm both the LLC and the state enforcing the contract.
I. WHOSE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT DOES LLC LAW PROTECT?
Applying freedom-of-contract principles should require a
preliminary determination that a contract among the parties does in
fact exist and, in turn, a determination of the parties’ identities. As
uncontroversial as that proposition might seem, in light of the

3. For example, many LLC statutes allow the LLC to bring a suit and to enforce
contribution pledges from its members. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 17,201 (West Supp. 1999);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-502(a) (1993); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 502 (McKinney 19992000).
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decisions in Elf Atochem North America, Inc. v. Jaffari4 and Bubbles
5
& Bleach, L.L.C. v. Becker, its application to LLC law is not
straightforward. In both cases courts applied standard principles of
freedom of contract to similar fact patterns. The courts reached
opposite conclusions, however, concerning whether an LLC’s failure
to sign an operating agreement that contains an arbitration clause and
a choice-of-forum clause should matter when all of the LLC members
signed the agreement. In Bubbles & Bleach, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that an LLC was not
bound by such an agreement.6 In Elf Atochem, by contrast, the
Delaware Supreme Court held that an LLC was bound to an
agreement among, and signed by, its members.7 To the extent that
freedom of contract protects the interests of the contracting parties,
the discrepancy between the two cases largely results from the courts’
divergence as to when and whether an LLC is an entity whose
integrity must be respected. Comparing an LLC with other business
forms suggests not only that an LLC does in fact merit consideration
as an independent entity8 but also that a state has an interest in having
the affairs of domestic LLCs resolved in its courts, applying its law.9
Principles of conflict of laws, citizenship, and the internal affairs
doctrine likewise shed light on the interest that both an LLC and its
state of formation have in the LLC’s status as an independent entity.
A. Two Cases, Two Conclusions
To the extent that an LLC exists as an entity apart from its
members, it should not itself be bound by an agreement among its
members simply by virtue of their having signed it. Thus, an LLC’s
failure to sign an operating agreement that contains an arbitration
clause and a choice-of-forum clause should matter even if all the LLC
members signed the agreement. The Bubbles & Bleach court reached
exactly this conclusion; the Elf Atochem court did not. These cases
present the conflict between protecting the LLC as an independent
entity and preserving the principles of freedom of contract.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

727 A.2d 286 (Del. 1999).
No. 97 C 1320, 1997 WL 285938 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 1997).
Id. at *6.
Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 287.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.B.2.
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Elf Atochem involved a derivative claim brought by Elf Atochem
North America, Inc., a member of Malek LLC. The complaint alleged
that Cyrus A. Jaffari, another member of the LLC, had breached his
fiduciary duty to Malek LLC, pushed the LLC to virtual insolvency
by withdrawing funds for personal use, interfered with its business
opportunities, and tortiously interfered with business relations.10
Malek LLC was formed in Delaware by Elf Atochem North America,
Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, Jaffari, and Malek, Inc., of which
Jaffari was CEO.11 The three parties entered into a series of
agreements providing for the operation and governance of Malek
LLC.12 The sticking point of the Elf Atochem case was an arbitration
provision in the LLC agreement, which was signed by Elf Atochem,
Jaffari, and Malek, Inc.13 The arbitration clause provided that any
controversy arising out of the agreement, the interpretation of any of
its provisions, or the action of any member under the agreement had
to be submitted to arbitration in San Francisco.14 Another clause in
the LLC agreement similarly provided that all members consented to
exclusive jurisdiction of California in any claim arising out of the
agreement.15 The distribution agreement entered into by Elf Atochem
and Malek LLC, in contrast, contained neither an arbitration nor a
choice-of-forum provision.16 In evaluating Elf Atochem’s derivative
claim, the Delaware Supreme Court held that Malek LLC was bound
by the arbitration and choice-of-forum provisions,17 even though it
was not a signatory to them.
The facts of Bubbles & Bleach, LLC v. Becker were similar to
those of Elf Atochem.18 The operating agreement of Bubbles &
Bleach, LLC contained an arbitration and choice-of-forum clause that
selected Wisconsin law.19 Members Faye Becker and Richard Ross,
10. Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 289.
11. Id. at 288.
12. Id. Delaware LLC law allows the certificate of formation to be filed before the
formation of the LLC agreement. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-201(d) (1993). The agreement
becomes effective as of the time the certificate is filed. Id. The Elf Atochem court characterized
the certificate of formation as “the first statutory step in creating the LLC as a separate legal
entity.” Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 288.
13. Id. at 288-89.
14. Id. at 288.
15. Id. at 288-89.
16. Id. at 288. The distribution agreement provided that Elf Atochem would be the
exclusive distributor for Malek LLC and Jaffari would be the manager for Malek LLC. Id.
17. Id. at 287.
18. No. 97 C 1320, 1997 WL 285938, at *1-3 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 1997).
19. Id. at *4.
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the president of member Bilger Corporation, were signatories to the
agreement.20 Bubbles & Bleach, LLC brought suit against Becker for
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and conversion, as well as other
claims.21 In allowing the suit to proceed in court, the district court held
that Bubbles & Bleach, LLC was not bound by the arbitration and
choice-of-forum clauses, because it was not a party to them.22
B. The Impact of Pro-Arbitration Policies on the Elf Atochem and
Bubbles & Bleach Decisions
Both the Elf Atochem and Bubbles & Bleach courts had to
consider the enforceability of contractual arbitration provisions
against an LLC in light of policies favoring arbitration. The operating
agreements of the LLCs in both cases contained provisions subjecting
claims arising out of the agreements to arbitration.23 The Elf Atochem
court viewed the arbitration provision in the Malek LLC operating
agreement as being in line with the state policy favoring methods of
alternative dispute resolution, including arbitration.24 It then
determined that the purpose of encouraging arbitration outweighed
the Delaware LLC Act’s purposes for vesting the Court of Chancery
with jurisdiction.25
26
DMS Properties-First, Inc. v. P.W. Scott Associates, Inc. raises
some interesting points about the scope of the state’s pro-arbitration
policy, however. In DMS, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the
Court of Chancery had erred in upholding an arbitrator’s
determination of the issue of arbitrability.27 The Court of Chancery in
the DMS case had considered whether to vacate an arbitration
20. Id.
21. Id. at *3.
22. Id. at *6.
23. See supra notes 13-22 and accompanying text.
24. Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 292.
25. Id. at 295-96. Chapter 57 of title 10 of the Delaware Code contains the state provisions
on arbitration. Section 5701 of title 10 provides, in part, that “[a] written agreement to submit to
arbitration any controversy existing at or arising after the effective date of the agreement is
valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5701 (1975). The Federal Arbitration
Act, meanwhile, provides that “[a] written provision in any . . . contract . . . to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is “to place
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
26. 748 A.2d 389 (Del. 2000).
27. Id. at 393.
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panel’s determination that there was no valid agreement to arbitrate
between the plaintiff, DMS, and the defendant, Scott Associates.28
The president of Scott Associates and Dennis Salter, of the Delaware
corporation Holcomb & Salter, had signed an arbitration agreement
to cover a specific building project.29 Salter used DMS as the principal
entity through which the project proceeded.30 Salter signed the
agreement on behalf of Holcomb & Salter.31 DMS was neither
mentioned in the agreement nor later substituted as a party for Salter
or for Holcomb & Salter.32
The Vice Chancellor confirmed the arbitrator’s determination
that no valid agreement to arbitrate existed between DMS and Scott.
In so doing, the Vice Chancellor noted that “[h]ad Scott lost the issue
before the arbitrators and had DMS obtained an award against it,
Scott could have sought to vacate the award” under section 5714 of
title 10 of the Delaware Code, which provides that a party may move
to vacate an arbitration award on the grounds that “[t]here was no
valid arbitration agreement.”33 The Vice Chancellor agreed that there
was no binding agreement to arbitrate between DMS and Scott and
cited the lack of any writing that documented the creation of a new
contract between DMS and Scott as evidence of this conclusion.34 On
appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Court of Chancery
erred in deferring to the arbitrator’s determination of substantive
arbitrability.35 The Supreme Court explained that whether the parties
had agreed to arbitrate was a question for the court, not for the
arbitrator.36 Specifically, the court noted:
A party cannot be forced to arbitrate the merits of a dispute,
however, in the absence of a clear expression of such an intent in a
valid agreement. . . . A party who has not agreed to arbitrate has a

28. Id. at 390.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5714(a)(5) (1999).
34. DMS Props.-First, Inc. v. P.W. Scott Assocs., No. CIV. A. 16450, 1999 WL 1261335, at
*6 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1999).
35. DMS Props.-First, Inc., 748 A.2d at 393. “Substantive arbitrability” refers to whether
the parties had agreed to arbitrate in the first place. Id. at 391.
36. Id. at 391. The Delaware Supreme Court conceded that whether the parties had agreed
to arbitrate was a question for the court, not the arbitrator, unless the parties had clearly agreed
to submit the question of arbitrability to arbitration. Id.
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right to have the merits of dispute adjudicated ab initio by a court of
37
competent jurisdiction.

Noting that DMS had “not clearly agree[d] to submit the question of
arbitrability to the arbitrators,”38 the Supreme Court held that “[t]he
Court of Chancery should have received evidence regarding whether
an agreement to arbitrate actually existed between DMS and Scott
Associates and then independently determined the issue of nonarbitrability de novo.”39 The Supreme Court remanded the case to the
Court of Chancery to make this determination.40
Applying the logic expressed in DMS to the facts in Elf Atochem
might have led to a different outcome, even in light of the policy
favoring arbitration. In enforcing the arbitration and choice-of-forum
provisions against Malek LLC, the Elf Atochem court emphasized
that the LLC members were the “real parties in interest.”41 In some
respects, though, Dennis Salter, as president, was the “real party in
interest” of DMS. The Court of Chancery nonetheless agreed with
the arbitrator’s determination that there was no binding agreement
between DMS and Scott.42 And while the Delaware Supreme Court
reversed the Court of Chancery’s deferential upholding of the
arbitrator’s decision, the court expressly indicated that “DMS did not
clearly agree to submit the question of arbitrability to the
arbitrators.”43 The higher court in DMS also emphasized generally the
importance of a clear expression of intent to arbitrate, even in light of
the state policy favoring arbitration.44
The Bubbles & Bleach court offered a more limited view of the
policy favoring arbitration than the Elf Atochem court, similarly
emphasizing the relevance of the parties’ intent to agree to arbitrate.
Most importantly, the court explained that while this policy applies to
issues regarding the scope of the arbitration, it does not “‘extend to
parties who never agreed to arbitrate in the first place.’”45 The
Bubbles & Bleach court then considered the LLC’s intent with
37. Id.
38. Id. at 392.
39. Id. at 393.
40. Id.
41. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 293 (Del. 1999).
42. DMS Props.-First, Inc., 748 A.2d at 390.
43. Id. at 392.
44. Id. at 391.
45. Bubbles & Bleach, LLC v. Becker, No. 97 C 1320, 1997 WL 285938, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
May 23, 1997) (quoting Grunstad v. Ritt, 106 F.3d 201, 205 n.5 (7th Cir. 1997)).
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respect to the arbitration provisions.46 In so doing, the Bubbles &
Bleach court relied on the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Grunstad v.
47
Ritt. In Grunstad, the Seventh Circuit faced the issue of whether a
guarantor of a party to an agreement was bound by the arbitration
clause of that agreement.48 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that a
nonsignatory guarantor could be bound by an arbitration provision
where the guaranty incorporated the underlying agreement; however,
mere reference to the main contract would not be sufficient to
establish the guarantor’s consent to arbitration.49 The Grunstad court
suggested that specific language would be necessary to bind a
guarantor to an arbitration clause in the underlying agreement.50
C. Freedom of Contract and Noncontracting LLCs
The analyses in these various cases all implicate principles of
freedom of contract, mainly that a party should be free to consent, or
not to consent, to certain contractual provisions. The degree of
flexibility accorded to the drafters of LLC agreements highlights the
importance of this principle.51 As the opinion in Elf Atochem
demonstrates, promoting the freedom of such drafters to contract can
occur at the expense of the LLC.
The Delaware Limited Liability Company Act provides that its
policy is “to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of
contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company
agreements.”52 Larry E. Ribstein and Robert R. Keatinge have
described Delaware law as giving “much power” to LLC
agreements.53 They explain that under Delaware law, the LLC
agreement “should be able to control relations among those persons
holding interests in the LLC, as well as the structure of the LLC
46. The Elf Atochem court did not consider the LLC’s intent with respect to the
agreement. Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 286. Nonetheless, one of the cases cited by the Elf
Atochem court in support of the Delaware policy favoring arbitration stated that, while “[a]ny
doubt as to arbitrability is to be resolved in favor of arbitration,” SBC Interactive, Inc. v.
Corporate Media Partners, 714 A.2d 758, 761 (citing Pettinaro Constr. Co. v. Harry C.
Partridge, Jr., & Sons, Inc., 408 A.2d 957, 962-63 (Del. Ch. 1979)), a court “will not compel a
party to arbitrate . . . absent a clear expression of such an intent.” Id. at 761.
47. 106 F.3d 201 (7th Cir. 1997).
48. Id. at 202-03.
49. Id. at 204 n.4.
50. Id. at 205.
51. See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
52. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (1999).
53. 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LLCS
§ 14.01[3][b] (1997).
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itself.”54 The Uniform Limited Liability Company Act has likewise
been interpreted as allowing an LLC to be fashioned almost entirely
by the agreement of its members.55
It is not altogether surprising, then, that the Elf Atochem court
characterized the LLC agreement exclusively as a contract of the
members. Comparing LLCs to limited partnerships, the Elf
Atochem court applied the following observation about limited
partnerships (LP) to LLCs:
The Act’s basic approach is to permit partners to have the broadest
possible discretion in drafting their partnership agreements and to
furnish answers only in situations where the partners have not
expressly made provisions in their partnership agreement. . . . Once
partners exercise their contractual freedom in their partnership
agreement, the partners have a great deal of certainty that their
partnership agreement will be enforced in accordance with its
56
terms.

The Elf Atochem court insisted further that a member’s
agreement would only be invalid when it was inconsistent with
mandatory statutory provisions and that such provisions were likely
those intended to protect third parties, not the contracting members.57
The Elf Atochem court did not treat an LLC itself as a third
party warranting such protection, even where the LLC was not an
express party to an LLC agreement. In fact, the Elf Atochem court
did not consider Malek LLC an entity that would need to sign and be
party to the agreement. In reference to the LLC agreement, the Elf
Atochem court explained, “[i]t is the members who are the real
54. Id. § 14.01[3]. For example, section 18-306 permits an LLC agreement to impose
penalties on managers or members who breach the agreement. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-306.
Section 18-108 authorizes the LLC agreement to include an indemnification provision. Id. § 18108. Section 18-402 allows the agreement to alter the default management provisions. Id. § 18402. Finally, section 18-106(b) provides:
A limited liability company shall possess and may exercise all the powers and
privileges granted . . . by its limited liability company agreement, together with any
powers incidental thereto, including such powers and privileges as are necessary or
convenient to the conduct, promotion or attainment of the business, purposes or
activities of the limited liability company.
Id. § 18-106(b).
55. Gazur, supra note 1, at 144.
56. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 291 (Del. 1999) (quoting MARTIN I.
LUBAROFF & PAUL M. ALTMAN, DELAWARE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS § 1.2 (1999)).
Obviously, as applied to LLC agreements, this quotation makes sense only if “members” is
substituted for “partners” and “LLC agreements” is substituted for “partnership agreements.”
57. Id. at 292.
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parties in interest. The LLC is simply their joint business vehicle.”58 In
discussing the validity of arbitration provisions in LLC agreements,
the Elf Atochem court saw no reason why members could not alter
the default jurisdictional provisions of the Delaware statute—which
vest the Court of Chancery with jurisdiction over matters involving
removing managers as well as interpreting and enforcing LLC
agreements59—and “contract away their right” to bring suit in
Delaware for purposes of convenience.60 While Elf Atochem involved
a derivative suit brought by a member on behalf of Malek LLC,61 the
Elf Atochem analysis raises a question as to whether the action would
still have been subject to arbitration if Malek LLC had brought the
suit on its own behalf.62 The court’s analysis seems to suggest,

58. Id. at 293. Professors Ribstein and Keatinge likewise suggest that the primary parties to
an LLC agreement are the members and that the definition of an LLC agreement under the
Delaware statute mentions only members and assignees suggests that others are excluded as
parties. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 53, § 14.01[3][a].
59. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-110, 18-111 (1999).
60. Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 295.
61. Section 18-1001 provides:
A member . . . may bring an action in the Court of Chancery in the right of a limited
liability company to recover a judgment in its favor if managers or members with
authority to do so have refused to bring the action or if an effort to cause those
managers or members to bring the action is not likely to succeed.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1001 (1999). The Elf Atochem court described the derivative suit as
“a corporate concept grafted onto the limited liability form.” Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 293. The
court characterized the classification of Elf Atochem’s suit as derivative as “irrelevant,”
reasoning first that Elf Atochem had contracted away its right to bring a derivative suit in
Delaware and second that the agreement’s arbitration and forum provisions did not distinguish
between direct and derivative claims. Id. at 293-95.
62. Unlike Elf Atochem, in Bubbles & Bleach the suit was initiated by the LLC. Given the
very different analysis of the nature of LLC agreements offered by the Delaware Supreme
Court in Elf Atochem, however, this precedent is not particularly helpful in predicting how the
Delaware courts would view an LLC-initiated suit. Also, the Bubbles & Bleach court did not
have to balance its analysis with the concern that members would couch claims as derivative in
order to avoid being bound by arbitration provisions in the agreement, a legitimate problem
recognized by the Elf Atochem court.
Delaware law apparently provides that an LLC may be a party in an action for the
breach of an LLC agreement. As Professors Ribstein and Keatinge point out, the Delaware
Limited Liability Company Act contemplates that members and managers may, under the
provisions of the LLC agreement, be subject to “specified consequences” upon its breach.
RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 53, § 14.01[3][e][iv] (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18306(1) (1999). Delaware law grants standing to an LLC in other types of actions; for example,
section 18-603 provides that an LLC may recover damages from a resigning manager. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-603 (1999) (prohibiting a member from resigning prior to the dissolution
and winding up of the LLC unless specifically permitted in the LLC agreement). Furthermore,
Delaware law expressly allows derivative actions to be brought on behalf of an LLC. Id. §§ 181001, 18-1002.
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however, that an LLC’s interest in not having its agreement enforced
against it is not enough to counteract freedom-of-contract principles.63
Both the decision in Bubbles & Bleach, LLC v. Becker and
Ribstein & Keatinge on LLCs suggest that an LLC should not be
subject to arbitration or choice-of-forum provisions in an agreement
to which it is not a party. In discussing the possibility of enforcing an
agreement against nonmember managers, for example, Ribstein and
Keatinge argue that consequences authorized by an agreement should
not be enforceable against a manager who has not assented to the
agreement, according to contract-law principles.64 They also note that
an agreement among fewer than all of the members should not affect
the management or financial rights of a member who is not a party to
the agreement.65
Bubbles & Bleach, meanwhile, clearly holds that a provision in
an LLC agreement is not enforceable against the LLC when the LLC
is not a party to the agreement.66 Unlike the Elf Atochem court, the
Bubbles & Bleach court analyzed the agreement based on the
assumption that an LLC is an entity: “[I]t is this characteristic of
limited liability companies—their distinct legal existence as an entity
apart from their constituent members—which allows them to shield
their members from personal liability and distinguishes them from
both general and limited partnerships.”67 The court then inquired as
to whether the agreement “unambiguously express[ed] [the LLC’s]
intent to be personally bound by the arbitration clause.”68 The district
63. Advocates of applying contract principles to corporate law have intimated that the
identity of the corporate form is a matter of convenience and not of importance. See
generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 8-15 (1991) (observing that the essence of a corporation’s personhood is the
combination of the entity’s contracts and the individual actors who participate in entity
transactions). This Note argues that applying concepts of corporate identity, namely the internal
affairs doctrine and the determination of citizenship, to LLC law suggests that the identity of the
LLC is at least as much of a reality as that of the corporation. Furthermore, given the potential
interest of a state in the development of its LLC business and the internal affairs of its LLCs,
the identity of the LLC is a matter of concern. See infra Part III.
64. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 53, § 14.01[3][a]. At the same time, Professors
Ribstein and Keatinge note that a properly drafted LLC agreement would not be unenforceable
merely by reason of its not having been signed by a person admitted as a member or an
assignee. Id. § 14.01[3][c] (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7)(b) (1999), which provides
that a limited liability company agreement “[s]hall not be unenforceable by reason of its not
having been signed by a person being admitted as a member or becoming an assignee”).
65. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 53, § 4.16.
66. Bubbles & Bleach, LLC v. Becker, No. 97 C 1320, 1997 WL 285938, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
May 23, 1997).
67. Id. at *4.
68. Id.
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court determined that Wisconsin law, under which Bubbles & Bleach,
LLC was formed, does not intend operating agreements to bind
LLCs, “entities distinct from their constituent members.”69 The court
noted further that the Bubbles & Bleach, LLC agreements did not
demonstrate that the member-signatories had signed on behalf or in
the name of the LLC. It accepted that, even though the agreements
governed some aspects of the LLC’s operation, the LLC was not
necessarily bound by the arbitration and choice-of-forum provisions
in them.70 Other state statutes might support a similar interpretation
of LLC agreements as that offered by the Bubbles & Bleach decision.
In fact, statutes in some states explicitly define an LLC as “an
entity.”71
While the recognition of an LLC as a separate entity for
purposes of limited liability could carry over to an analysis as to
whether it would be bound by provisions in an operating agreement,
as in Bubbles & Bleach, the Elf Atochem court identified a potential
problem with such an analysis. Specifically, the Elf Atochem court did
not want to encourage members to couch their claims as derivative in
order to avoid arbitration and choice-of-forum provisions and claim
subject matter jurisdiction in the Court of Chancery.72 Such a tactic
would conflict with a policy favoring arbitration.73 A hard-and-fast
rule that, for the purposes of interpreting LLC agreements, the

69. Id. In support of its reasoning, the Bubbles & Bleach court cited the statutory definition
of an LLC operating agreement, which provides that an “operating agreement” is a written
agreement “among all of the members as to the conduct of the business of a limited liability
company and its relationships with its members.” Id. at *4. Delaware law defines an LLC
agreement as “any agreement . . . of the . . . members as to the affairs of a limited liability
company and the conduct of its business.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101(7) (1999).
70. Bubbles & Bleach, 1997 WL 285938, at *5.
71. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7603(b) (1995) (“A limited liability company formed under
this act shall be a separate legal entity and shall not be construed as a corporation.”); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-1002 (Michie 1999) (defining an LLC as “an entity that is an unincorporated
association”). The Uniform Limited Liability Act (ULLCA) similarly states that “[a] limited
liability company is a legal entity distinct from its members.” UNIF. LTD. LIAB. ACT § 201, 6A
U.L.A. 443 (1995). The ULLCA has been enacted, with some modifications, in Alabama,
Hawaii, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia. ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1
to -12-61 (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 428-101 to -1302 (Michie 1997); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 33-44-101 to -44-1207 (West Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-34A-101 to -34A-1207
(Michie Supp. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3001-3162 (1997); W. VA. CODE §§ 31B-1-101 to
-1-1306 (1996 & Michie Supp. 1999). Five of these states contain language similar to section 201
of the ULLCA. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 428-201 (“A limited liability company is a legal entity
distinct from its members.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-201 (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 4734A-201 (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3021 (same); W. VA. CODE § 31B-2-201 (same).
72. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 296 (Del. 1999).
73. Id. at 295.
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members of the LLC and the LLC itself are one and the same is
equally problematic, however. As the opinion in Bubbles &
Bleach noted, “such a rule necessarily assumes (or requires) that the
LLC can enforce the agreement against the members. To allow
enforcement by the LLC seems inconsistent with the basis for the rule
in the first place, that is, that the members are the LLC and vice
versa.”74 Regrettably, this inconsistency was not addressed by the
court in Elf Atochem v. Jaffari.
II. SHOULD FREEDOM-OF-CONTRACT PRINCIPLES PROTECT
CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF FORUM?
An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a
specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the
situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the
75
dispute.

The Supreme Court has stated that any doubt as to the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.76 One
argument in favor of enforcing choice-of-law and choice-of-forum
provisions generally is that doing so reduces uncertainty at the time of
contracting, so that the parties know to what standard of conduct they
should conform.77 The Delaware Supreme Court enforced the
arbitration and choice-of-forum provisions at issue in Elf Atochem,
even though the LLC involved was not an express party to those
provisions. In so doing, the Elf Atochem court treated the LLC as a
partnership, holding that an LLC does not exist independently from
its members for purposes of enforceability of the provisions of the
LLC agreement.
While the LLC certainly does resemble a partnership in certain
respects, the partnership analogy does not capture the breadth of the
LLC. The LLC also possesses characteristics of a corporation, which
has consistently been recognized as a distinct legal entity. As a
74. Bubbles & Bleach, LLC v. Becker, No. 97 C 1320, 1997 WL 285938, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
May 23, 1997).
75. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974); see also Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler-Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 630 (1985) (quoting this passage from
Scherk); Simitar Entm’t, Inc. v. Silva Entm’t, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 2d 986, 996 (D. Minn. 1999) (“In a
practical sense, an arbitration agreement operates as no more than a specialized choice-offorum provision, which has the effect of identifying the ‘situs of the suit,’ as well as the
procedures that govern its resolution.”).
76. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
77. Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 253 (1993).
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distinct legal entity, a corporation has interests that can be affected by
a determination of which law governs particular disputes. This part
compares the LLC with the corporation to suggest that the
independence of the LLC itself should be considered before it is
subjected to a particular forum or law. This part also examines how
conflict-of-laws, citizenship, and internal affairs principles determine
the law governing other types of business associations and could be
used to determine which law should govern an LLC.
A. The Partnership Analogy
The LLC is often compared with a partnership.78 Application of
partnership law, as presented by the Restatement provisions on
choice of law, suggests that an LLC should not expect to have its
affairs resolved by the laws of its formation state.79 The partnership
analogy is not a perfect one, however. Australian law, for example,
explicitly recognizes a distinction between its equivalent of a
partnership and that of a limited liability company.80 Imperfections in
the comparison between a partnership and an LLC, in turn,
demonstrate the usefulness of comparing the LLC to other business
forms, principally the corporation.
1. Strengths of the Analogy and the According Application of
Contract Principles. The limited liability company is often compared
to a partnership. Many state LLC laws contain provisions originated,
at least formally, from partnership law.81 Courts and scholars alike
have especially focused on the limited partnership as an analogy for
the LLC.82 The Elf Atochem court endorsed this analogy in noting

78. Many scholars and courts, including the Elf Atochem court, have noted certain
similarities between the LLC and the partnership. E.g., Gazur, supra note 1, at 135-36 (“[M]ost
states’ LLC laws utilize, in varying degrees, provisions clearly of partnership origin.”); Keatinge
et al., supra note 1, at 396-403 (comparing LLCs to both limited and general partnerships).
79. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
81. Gazur, supra note 1, at 135.
82. E.g., Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that an LLC is
like a limited partnership for purposes of citizenship in diversity jurisdiction); Weber v. King,
110 F. Supp. 2d 124, 131-32 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (relying on an analogy to limited partnerships to
permit plaintiffs to commence a derivative suit on behalf of an LLC); Interactive Servs. Inc. v.
Vista Net L.L.C., 1999 WL 1186429 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 1999) (finding that an LLC is like a
limited partnership for purposes of citizenship in diversity jurisdiction); Fallany O. Stover &
Susan Pace Hamill, The LLC Versus LLP Conundrum: Advice for Businesses Contemplating the
Choice, 50 ALA. L. REV. 813 (1999) (providing an extensive comparison of LLCs and limited
partnerships).
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that the Delaware Limited Partnership Act served as a model for the
state’s Limited Liability Company Act, describing the form and
language of the two acts as “almost identical.”83 In particular, the Elf
Atochem court emphasized that freedom of contract underlies both
the state LP and LLC Acts and that the LLC Act treats a member of
an LLC much like a limited partner is treated under the LP Act.84
If an LLC is assumed to be similar to a limited partnership, the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws suggests that a
determination of the validity of choice-of-law provisions in an LLC
agreement should depend on principles of contract law. The
Restatement provides that “[t]he rights and duties owned by partners
to each other are determined by the local law of the state which, with
respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to
the partners and the transaction under the principles stated” in
section six.85 The rules in sections 187 and 188 in turn determine
which state’s law is the “most significant.”86
Section 188 dictates which law should govern the rights and
duties of the parties to a contract in the absence of an effective choice
of law by the parties. It provides that these rights and duties be
determined by the local law of the state that has the “most significant
relationship” to the parties and the transaction under the principles of
section six.87 Section six, in turn, states that a court will follow a
statutory directive of its own state on choice of law,88 but that, where
such a directive is lacking, a court should consider the following
factors as relevant to the choice of the applicable law:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
83. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 290 (Del. 1999). In their presentation
of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, Professors Ribstein and Keatinge include a
table denoting those provisions of the statute that derive from the state Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 53, § 14.02, tbl. 14.1.
84. Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 290 (citing Martin I. Lubaroff & Paul M. Altman, Delaware
Limited Liability Companies, in DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS, §§ 20.3, 20.4 (R. Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein eds., 1998)).
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 294 (1971).
86. Id. §§ 187-88.
87. Id. § 188(1).
88. Id. § 6(1).
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(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
89
applied.

Section 188 delineates certain contacts to be taken into account
when applying these principles to situations in which parties have not
made an effective choice of law. Under section 188, a determination
of which law should govern requires consideration of “(a) the place of
contracting, (b) the place of negotiation, (c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the
domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties.”90
Section 187, meanwhile, covers those situations in which
contracting parties have chosen a particular law. It provides that the
chosen law should be applied unless the chosen state has “no
substantial relationship” to the parties or to the transaction and
“there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’ choice”91 or unless
application of the chosen law would be contrary to “a fundamental
policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the
chosen state in the determination of the particular issue.”92
To the extent that partnership relations are covered by
contractual principles of conflict of laws (as provided in section 294 of
the Restatement), a partnership operating outside its formation state
“cannot be assured of being governed by its formation-state rules.”93
Equating an LLC with a partnership would therefore suggest that
Malek LLC, the LLC involved in the dispute in Elf Atochem, should
not necessarily have expected the issue to be resolved in Delaware,
where it was formed and where the action was actually filed. Given
this consideration, forcing Malek LLC to abide by contractual
provisions and have its dispute resolved in arbitration in California
seems fairly reasonable—even though the LLC was not an express
party to those contracts.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. § 6(2).
Id. § 188(2).
Id. § 187(2)(a).
Id. § 187(2)(b).
Ribstein, supra note 77, at 269.
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2. Imperfections in the Partnership Analogy. The analogy
between a limited liability company and a partnership, however, is
not a perfect fit. Although the LLC is similar to the partnership, “in
many respects aside from the limited liability factor, the analogy is
weakened by the greater range of the LLC.”94 The LLC can function
in a partnership manner or in a corporate manner, characterized by a
greater degree of separation between ownership and management.95
In Delaware, for example, an LLC agreement can “[a]t minimum”
govern any subject or establish any arrangement properly treated in a
partnership agreement.96 The Delaware LLC is an amalgam of limited
partnership and corporate characteristics.97 As described by the Elf
Atochem opinion, it “combines corporate-type limited liability with
partnership-type flexibility and tax advantages.”98 Importantly, as
identified by the Bubbles & Bleach court,99 the LLC, unlike a
partnership, exists as a separate entity apart from its members, at
least for purposes of limited liability.100
Analysis of the law of Australia, another common law
jurisdiction, likewise suggests the imperfections of the partnership
analogy. Australian law draws a clear distinction between limited
liability companies and partnerships. An Australian limited liability
company is an independent entity but is statutorily bound by the

94. Gazur, supra note 1, at 156.
95. Id. at 156-57.
96. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 53, § 14.01[3] (emphasis added).
97. Id. § 14.01[6][a]; see also James G. Leyden, Jr., A Key State’s Approach to LLCs, BUS.
LAW TODAY, May-June 2000, at 51 (“The Delaware Limited Liability Company Act . . . is
modeled on the state’s well-accepted limited partnership statute . . . . In addition, several
provisions from the Delaware General Corporation Law have been incorporated into the
DLLC Act.”).
98. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 290 (Del. 1999).
99. Bubbles & Bleach, LLC v. Becker, No. 97 C 1320, 1997 WL 285938, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
May 23, 1997).
100. In considering whether interests in an LLC constituted securities for purposes of the
federal securities laws, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware
distinguished the LLC from both the general and limited partnership:
The primary differences between LLCs and general partnerships are that members of
LLCs are entitled to limited liability, and . . . the members of the LLC may be less
involved in the management of the enterprise than partners in a general
partnership . . . . In comparison with limited partnerships, the Delaware Limited
Liability Company Act permits a member in an LLC to be an active participant in
management and still to retain limited liability.
Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 96 F. Supp. 2d 376, 391-92 (D. Del. 2000). The court
concluded that the presumptions about partnerships applied in securities cases did not apply to
LLCs and instead held that the terms of a particular LLC’s operating agreement would
determine whether interests in that LLC were securities. Id. at 392.
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terms of its agreement. An Australian company is a common law
corporation that has been registered under part 2 of the Corporations
Law.101 A common law corporation is “a legal device by which legal
rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, liabilities and disabilities
may be attributed to a fictional entity equated for many purposes to a
natural person.”102 A limited liability company, in turn, is a company
whose members have limited liability.103 The concept of a company as
a legal entity separate from the legal persons who are its members is
important in Australian law;104 it is often the reason why a company is
chosen as a vehicle for business.105 An Australian company’s
constitution (which serves as a memorandum of association),106
however, operates like a contract under seal between the company
and each member and between the company and each eligible officer,
as well as between the members.107 In this respect, while an Australian
limited liability company is clearly an independent entity, by statute,
it is bound by the terms of its agreement.
B. The Corporation Analogy
Whether a limited liability company formed under state law
should be treated as a partnership or as a corporation is not so clear.
To the extent that the LLC enjoys corporate-type treatment for
purposes of liability, the application of corporate-type treatment for
purposes of governing law merits consideration.108 Principles of
101. H.A.J. FORD & R.P. AUSTIN, FORD AND AUSTIN’S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATIONS
LAW § 1.050 (7th ed. 1995).
102. Id.
103. Id. § 1.080.
104. Id. § 4.140 (describing the “separate entity doctrine”).
105. Id. § 1.070 (“The separate legal personality of a company is usually the explanation as
to why a company has been chosen for the conduct of some business enterprise or social
organisation.”).
106. Id. § 6.010:
A company’s constitution consists of its memorandum of association and its articles.
In the process of incorporation the memorandum of association provides the ASC
[Australian Securities Commission] with evidence that associated persons desire the
ASC to incorporate them as a registered company. But it also provides some of the
terms of upon which [sic] the incorporators became associated. Other terms are
provided by the articles.
107. Id. § 6.030.
108. A Delaware Superior Court has, in fact, held that an LLC should be treated as a
corporation such that it is subject to the court rule requiring a corporation to be represented by
legal counsel in litigation. Poore v. Fox Hollow Enters., No. 93A-09-005, 1994 WL 150872, at *2
(Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 1994) (“Ultimately, regulation of the practice of law rests in the
Delaware Supreme Court, not the legislature. The underlying purpose of the rule prohibiting
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citizenship and the internal affairs doctrine often determine whether
a particular court has jurisdiction over a corporation. These principles
could likewise be used to analyze whether a court should insist on
exercising jurisdiction over an LLC and thereby preserve the state’s
and the LLC’s interest in the LLC as an entity.
Citizenship analysis indicates that treating an LLC in the same
way as a corporation is within the power of the legislature.109
Historical consideration of the citizenship of common law entities
further suggests that such treatment might be proper.110
Application of the internal affairs doctrine also demonstrates the
possibility of corporate-type treatment of the LLC. The internal
affairs doctrine serves interests that are important in the LLC as well
as the corporate context;111 it benefits not only the entity and its
beneficial owners112 but also the state of formation.113
1. Citizenship Analysis. A corporation does not enjoy status as a
citizen within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
the United States Constitution.114 For purposes of determining federal
diversity jurisdiction, however, a corporation is treated as a citizen of
the state in which it is incorporated.115 The Supreme Court declined to
the appearance of a corporation by anyone other than a member of the Delaware Bar also
applies to the representation of Limited Liability Companies.”) In deciding whether “a Limited
Liability Company more closely resembles a partnership . . . or a corporation,” the Superior
Court noted that “the interest of a member in the LLC is analogous to shareholders of a
corporation.” Id. at *1-2; cf. Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d at 293 (“It is the members [of an LLC] who
are the real parties in interest. The LLC is simply their joint business vehicle.”).
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts similarly treated an
LLC as a corporation for purposes of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Fraser v. Major League
Soccer, L.L.C., 97 F. Supp. 2d 130, 135 (D. Mass. 2000) (holding that in the context of the
Sherman Act, “there is little reason to treat an LLC such as MLS differently from a
corporation”). In holding that the defendant LLC was not subject to the Sherman Act, the court
noted that the Sherman Act is “directed against contracts, combinations or conspiracies.” Id. at
134. The court also pointed out that each LLC member’s success was dependent upon the
success of the LLC as a whole. Id. at 136.
109. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 150, 154 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
114. P. John Kozyris, The Limited Liability Company: Does It Exist Out-of-State? What Law
Governs It?, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 565, 565 (1996) (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; id. amend. XIV,
§ 1); see also Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1868) (“The term citizens . . . applies
only to natural persons, members of the body politic . . . not to artificial persons created by the
legislature . . . .”).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1994). The federal statute provides that, for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction, a corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation and the state in which
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extend this citizenship rule to other business associations in Carden v.
116
Arkoma Associates.
Carden specifically held that a limited
partnership is not a citizen of the state in which it is organized but
rather of those states in which its partners are citizens.117 The Carden
majority further required that both limited and general partners must
be counted for purposes of calculating citizenship.118 To the extent
that an LLC is analogous to a partnership, Carden suggests that an
LLC is not a citizen of the state of its formation for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction.
Lower courts have subsequently ruled that an LLC does not
enjoy the same citizenship status as a corporation. The United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, for example, stated
that, with respect to diversity jurisdiction, “there is no justification for
treating a limited liability company like a corporation.”119 The United
States District Court for the Western District of Michigan reached a
similar conclusion, holding that, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction,
an LLC is not a citizen of the state in which it is organized unless one
of its members is a citizen of that state; the citizenship of an LLC is
that of its members.120 Other jurisdictions have likewise declined to
treat an LLC as a citizen of the state of which it was organized.121
The refusal to treat an LLC like a corporation for purposes of
federal diversity jurisdiction enjoys some pre-Carden precedent.
While relatively few states have recognized the limited partnership
association,122 it is often considered the earliest precursor of the
LLC.123 Specifically, in Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones,124
the Supreme Court held that a limited partnership association could
not be considered a citizen under the jurisdictional rule for
its principal place of business is located. Id. The latter condition of jurisdiction is not central to
this Note.
116. 494 U.S. 185, 189 (1990).
117. Id. at 195-96.
118. Id. (requiring that diversity jurisdiction in a suit by or against a limited partnership
depends on the citizenship of “all the members” of the organization).
119. JMTR Enters., L.L.C. v. Duchin, 42 F. Supp. 2d 87, 94 (D. Mass. 1999).
120. Int’l Flavors & Textures, L.L.C. v. Gardner, 966 F. Supp. 552, 554 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
121. E.g., Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1998); U.S.A. Seafood, L.L.C.
v. Koo, No. 97-CV-1687, 1998 WL 765160, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1998).
122. Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania created the limited partnership
association in the United States in the late nineteenth century and are among the few states that
have statutes recognizing partnership associations. Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 381-82.
123. E.g., id. at 381 (explaining that the current form of the LLC is based upon partnership
associations).
124. 177 U.S. 449 (1900).
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corporations, even though the limited partnership association
possessed “some of the characteristics of a corporation” and was
considered a “corporation” by the law that created it.125 As such, the
Great Southern holding contributes to the case law standing against
treating an LLC like a corporation for purposes of federal diversity
jurisdiction.
The fact that an LLC does not generally enjoy exactly similar
citizenship status as a corporation might suggest that an LLC, as a
separate entity, does not possess the same level of integrity as does a
corporation. It also might suggest that a state in which an LLC is
organized does not have the same interest in the affairs of a domestic
LLC as it does in a domestic corporation. The Carden Court,
however, expressly refrained from holding so broadly. The majority
stated only that principles of judicial restraint mandated that the LP
not be treated as a corporation for diversity purposes; it explicitly left
room for the legislature to provide otherwise.126 Thus, even current
citizenship analysis leaves room to argue that the LLC should enjoy
independent entity status similar to that of a corporation. Although
these decisions on their face indicate that, in the absence of a statute,
LLCs do not enjoy the citizenship status of a corporation, sufficient
ambiguity exists to suggest a justification for corporate-type
treatment of the LLC.
First, some precedent exists that arguably supports treating the
LLC more as an entity than as a conglomerate of its members for
purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction. In General Atlantic
Investments Ltd. v. Business Development Capital Limited
127
Partnership-II, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York treated a foreign LLC (one from another
country as opposed to from another state) as a corporation for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction and determined its citizenship based
on the LLC’s principal place of business.128 After Carden, however,

125. Id. at 456.
126. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 197. The Carden majority noted that its
holding could “validly be characterized as technical, precedent-bound, and unresponsive to
policy considerations raised by the changing realities of business organizations.” Id. at 196.
127. 620 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
128. Id. at 965 (treating a foreign corporation as an LLC without making its reasoning
explicit). Section 1332(c)(1) of title 28 of the United States Code provides that a corporation
may be treated as a citizen of both the state where it has its principal place of business and the
state in which it is incorporated. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1994).
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the same court later maintained that the holding in Carden had
rendered the Great Atlantic opinion inapplicable to an LLC.129
Even the Carden opinion itself, however, suggests that there is
some judicial support for comparing the LLC to a corporation for
purposes of citizenship analysis. The Carden majority went to great
lengths to distinguish the case of Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.,130 in
which a sociedad en comandita131 was treated as a citizen of Puerto
Rico for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction.132 A later case,
133
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc.,
had distinguished Russell as “fitting an exotic creation of the civil
law . . . into a federal scheme which knew it not.”134 The Carden Court
therefore concluded, based on the distinction offered in Bouligny:
There could be no doubt . . . that at least common-law entities (and
likely all entities beyond the Puerto Rican sociedad en comandita)
would be treated for purposes of the diversity statute pursuant to
what Russell called “[t]he tradition of the common law,” which is “to
treat as legal persons only incorporated groups and to assimilate all
135
others to partnerships.”

While this statement might seem absolute in its indication that
LLCs should not be treated as corporations for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction, the dissenting opinion in Carden suggests that a different
interpretation of Russell could, in fact, justify applying corporate
principles to LLCs.136 The Carden dissent noted that the modern
limited partnership, like the sociedad en comandita, has its origins in

129. Inarco Int’l Bank N.V. v. Lazard Freres & Co., No. 97 Civ. 0378(DAB), 1998 WL
427618, at *2 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998).
130. 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
131. The sociedad en comandita is “the civil law version of the modern limited partnership.”
Carden, 494 U.S. at 208 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). It is “consistently regarded as a juridical
person” that “may contract, own property, and transact business, sue and be sued in its own
name and right . . . . Its members are not thought to have a sufficient personal interest in a suit
brought against the entity to entitle them to intervene as parties defendant.” Russell, 288 U.S. at
481. Members of a sociedad en comandita may not intervene as defendants in a suit against the
sociedad, and the sociedad may endure beyond the death or withdrawal of its members. Id.
132. Russell, 288 U.S. at 482 (“[W]e see no adequate reason for holding that the sociedad
has a different status for purposes of federal jurisdiction than a corporation organized under
[Puerto Rican] law.”). But see Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 189-90 (1990) (referring
to Russell as “[t]he one exception to the admirable consistency of our jurisprudence on this
matter”).
133. 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
134. Id. at 151.
135. Carden, 494 U.S. at 190 (quoting Russell, 288 U.S. at 480).
136. Id. at 198-209 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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the civil law, including the French société en commandite.137 The
société en commandite was similar to the commenda arrangement
common in Mediterranean commerce in the Middle Ages, in which
suppliers of capital, who then entrusted it to merchant-seamen, risked
only the amount of their capital.138 In other words, “[t]he idea of
managers being liable without limit while inactive suppliers of capital
risked only their capital is ancient.”139 This historical view indicates
that the Russell opinion left room for noncorporate entities, possibly
including the LLC (to the extent that it is similar to the limited
partnership), to be addressed as corporations for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction.140
Furthermore, the Carden majority explicitly limited its holding
that a noncorporate entity could not be treated like a corporation to
those situations involving federal diversity jurisdiction. The basis for
the Carden Court’s refusal to extend citizenship status to noncorporate entities was not a substantive policy consideration but
rather a judgment that the determination of citizenship should be left
to the legislature.141 In fact, the Carden majority explicitly admitted
that its holding could “validly be characterized as technical,
precedent-bound, and unresponsive to policy considerations raised by
the changing realities of business organization.”142 Thus, the LLC
could arguably be treated as a corporation in determining citizenship
for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction, although that will most
likely not occur “unless and until Congress speaks as to the

137. Id. at 208 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
138. FORD & AUSTIN, supra note 101, § 1.230.
139. Id.
140. The first attempt to create an LLC in the United States apparently occurred in 1975,
when representatives of the Hamilton Brothers Oil Company lobbied the Alaska legislature to
authorize a business entity that combined limited liability and partnership tax treatment. Susan
Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1459, 1464
(1999). The Hamilton Oil Company had used foreign counterparts of the LLC, principally the
Panamanian limitada, to conduct oil and gas exploration throughout the 1960s. Id. at 1463. The
Panamanian limitada allowed for limited liability and partnership tax treatment. Id. Hamilton
Brothers Oil Company’s effort to persuade Alaska to enact legislation allowing a business entity
similar to the limitada arrangement failed. Id. at 1464-65 (describing the arguments made before
the Alaska legislature and the ultimate failure of the LLC legislation as being due to “political
reasons unrelated to the proposals”). Two years later, however, the company succeeded in
having the first LLC legislation passed in Wyoming. Id. at 1465.
141. Carden, 494 U.S. at 197 (“[T]he course we take today does not so much disregard the
policy of accommodating our diversity jurisdiction to the changing realities of commercial
organization, as it honors the more important policy of leaving that to the people’s elected
representatives.”).
142. Id. at 196.
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citizenship of limited liability companies.”143 Regardless, to the extent
that neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has explicitly provided
a substantive reason why the LLC is not treated as a citizen of the
state in which it is incorporated for purposes of jurisdiction, such
treatment is not absolutely precluded, particularly for other purposes.
The arguments that support applying corporate principles to the
determination of the citizenship of the LLC, meanwhile, strengthen
the proposition that, like the corporation, the LLC has integrity as an
entity that merits respect.144
2. Application of the Internal Affairs Doctrine to the LLC.
While the LLC has not been treated like a corporation for purposes
of citizenship,145 neither case law nor statutes explicitly deny that a
particular jurisdiction in which an LLC is organized has an interest in
having its courts resolve issues affecting the LLC. In contrast, the
established internal affairs doctrine recognizes that the state in which
a corporation is incorporated does have such a paramount interest
regarding corporations: “The internal affairs doctrine requires that
the law of the state of incorporation should determine issues relating
to internal corporate affairs.”146 Internal affairs generally include the
organizational structure, the relationships between the shareholders
and the managers, and the relationships among the shareholders of a
corporation.147
The internal affairs doctrine furthers several purposes. The
doctrine “serves the vital need for a single, constant and equal law to
avoid the fragmentation of continuing, interdependent internal
relationships.”148 It does not merely address concerns about forum
shopping and notions of territoriality (and in fact operates
independently of choice of forum); rather, it “validates the autonomy
of the parties in a subject where the underlying policy of the law is
enabling. It facilitates planning and enhances predictability.”149 The
internal affairs doctrine also involves issues of constitutional law. The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has, in particular,
been interpreted as providing that the directors and officers have a
143. JMTR Enters., L.L.C. v. Duchin, 42 F. Supp. 2d 87, 94 (D. Mass. 1999).
144. See supra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
146. McDermott v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 209 (Del. 1987).
147. P. John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1, 15.
148. Id. at 98.
149. Id.
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right to know what law will be applied to their actions and that
stockholders have a right to know to which standards of
accountability a corporation’s managers will be held.150
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws recognizes the
prevalence of the internal affairs doctrine and provides that “[t]he
local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine”
issues involving the rights and liabilities of a corporation unless “some
other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and
the parties.”151 This standard differs from that applied to contracts
under sections 187 and 188, which generally suggest a contacts test.152
This distinction between corporations and contracts is not without
criticism. Professor Ribstein, for example, has argued that “[a]
residence state does not clearly have a greater ‘interest’ or other basis
for regulating than a contractual state, particularly since the latter
may have a strong policy of encouraging selection of its law.”153
Professor P. John Kozyris, on the other hand, has taken a different
approach to whether the internal affairs doctrine should apply to
management’s fiduciary duties to a corporation and its shareholders;
he has proposed that, as between the state of incorporation and the
state of principal business, the former has a superior claim because
the shareholders are the ultimate beneficiaries of management’s
fiduciary duties.154 Interestingly, the derivative suit brought in Elf
155
Atochem sought to enforce a member’s duties to the LLC; perhaps,
then, the state where the LLC was organized, Delaware, had a
significant interest in resolving the dispute, either through its courts
or through application of its substantive law.
This argument does not really follow from the actual holding in
Elf Atochem because there the LLC was not treated as an
independent entity whose affairs would necessarily be of interest. Not
viewing the LLC as a distinct entity enabled the Elf Atochem court to
enforce a choice-of-forum provision against it. The context of this
reasoning puts a strange perspective on Professor Ribstein’s
150. McDermott, 531 A.2d at 216-17.
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 & cmt. a (1971).
152. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text. The contacts test generally requires that
a court consider the place of contracting; the place of negotiation; the place of performance; the
location of the subject matter of the contract; and the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation, and place of business of the parties to determine which law governs the rights
and duties of parties to a contract. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
153. Ribstein, supra note 77, at 256.
154. Kozyris, supra note 147, at 64.
155. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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argument that the enforcement of choice-of-law provisions in the
corporate context has been facilitated by the characterization of the
corporation as an entity.156 Professor Ribstein has even stated that
“corporations are entitled to legal protection because they are
contracts, and not because they are ‘creatures’ of state law.”157 As
demonstrated in Elf Atochem and Bubbles & Bleach, however,
treating an LLC as a contract and not as an entity does not
necessarily serve to protect the LLC, perhaps because the courts
cannot agree on whether an LLC is something that can be protected.
Delaware courts have, in fact, strongly maintained the distinction
between corporations and contracts for purposes of choice of law. In
158
for example, the Delaware Court of
Rosenmiller v. Bordes,
Chancery explicitly rejected the Supreme Court of Ohio’s holding in
159
Gries Sports Enterprises v. Modell. Gries presented the issue of
whether Delaware or Ohio law should apply to a voting agreement
between stockholders who, in the aggregate, owned at least 50% of a
Delaware corporation’s stock and which was silent as to choice of
law.160 A majority of the Ohio Supreme Court treated it as a contract
issue, not a corporate issue161 and applied the contacts test under
section 188 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law.162 The
court found that the place of contracting, the place of negotiation, the
location of the subject matter of the contract, and the place of
business of the parties was Ohio, while only the place of
incorporation was Delaware.163 Accordingly, it determined that “[t]he
conclusion is inescapable that Ohio ‘bears the most significant
relationship to the contract.’”164 The court, therefore, reversed a lower
court’s holding that the law of the state of incorporation governed the
agreement.165
The Delaware Court of Chancery found the Gries opinion
“unpersuasive” and “without any meaningful analysis of the
156. Ribstein, supra note 77, at 272-73.
157. Id. at 267.
158. 607 A.2d 465 (Del. Ch. 1991).
159. Id. at 469 (citing Gries Sports Enters. v. Modell, 473 N.E.2d 807 (Ohio 1984)).
160. Gries, 473 N.E.2d at 809.
161. Id. at 811 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he appellate court correctly determined that this
issue is one of corporate law, not contract law.”).
162. Id. at 810.
163. Id.
164. Id. (quoting Schulke Radio Prods. v. Midwestern Broad. Co., 453 N.E.2d 683, 685-86
(Ohio 1983)).
165. Id.
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constitutional and corporate law issues that mandate the application
of the doctrine of lex incorporationis.”166 In Rosenmiller, the court
applied Delaware law to invalidate the voting restriction provisions of
a shareholder agreement on the grounds that the time limit had
expired.167 The court insisted on applying the internal affairs doctrine
even though that decision was outcome-determinative: the agreement
explicitly provided that it should be construed under New Jersey law,
which would not have limited the agreement to a term of years.168
In reaching its holding, the Rosenmiller court emphasized the
importance of the internal affairs doctrine. It acknowledged that
section 187 of the Restatement calls for enforcing the parties’ choice
of law “unless the state whose law would control in the absence of a
choice has a materially greater interest in the subject matter.”169 For
the Rosenmiller court, the state of incorporation was of great
consequence. The court noted that “[i]t is well settled that, under the
internal affairs doctrine, the state of incorporation has the paramount
interest in having disputes of internal corporate governance resolved
according to its own laws.”170 So much for freedom of contract: the
Court of Chancery maintained that the internal affairs doctrine
governed the agreement between the stockholders and that the fact
that they chose another law did not affect its application.171 The Court
of Chancery held that, in spite of the choice of law, Delaware’s
interest in regulating voting rights in Delaware corporations was
greater than New Jersey’s interest.172 The court did not even address
the parties’ contacts with New Jersey.
Professor Kozyris has offered a potential rationale that may
explain the conflict between the Gries and Rosenmiller holdings. He
explains that, although the “new conflicts” rules, as seen in sections
302-306 and 309 allow a departure from the internal affairs doctrine

166. Rosenmiller v. Bordes, 607 A.2d 465, 469 (Del. Ch. 1991).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 468-69. The Gries court made a distinction between those cases where the parties
had designated a choice of law, as in Schulke and later in Rosenmiller, and those in which they
had not. Gries, 473 N.E.2d at 810.
169. Rosenmiller, 607 A.2d at 468 (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 468 (citing Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc.,
49 A.2d 603, 607 (Del. Ch. 1946)).
171. Id. at 469 (“The present dispute falls squarely within the internal affairs doctrine. The
factual circumstance that all voting stockholders chose New Jersey law is not sufficient to
remove the dispute from that doctrine.”).
172. Id. (“Delaware therefore has a greater interest than does New Jersey in regulating
stockholder voting rights in Delaware corporations.”).
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where another state has a more significant relationship to the
corporation, shareholders, or parties, courts almost always apply the
law of the state of incorporation without any discussion.173 As it
applies to corporations, the internal affairs doctrine still serves to
protect any interest the state of incorporation has in its affairs.
The doctrine of internal affairs could arguably be applied to the
LLC as well as to the corporation to protect any interest that the state
of the LLC’s organization has in the LLC. Some state LLC statutes
explicitly adopt the internal affairs doctrine, such that the internal
affairs of the LLC are subject exclusively to the laws of the state of
formation.174 The Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, for
example, provides that “[t]he laws of the state . . . under which a
foreign limited liability company is organized govern its organization
and internal affairs and the liability of its members and managers.”175
Even in the absence of such a statutory directive, however, policy
concerns could justify the extension of the internal affairs doctrine
from the corporation to the LLC.176 First, as Professor Kozyris has
argued, for purposes of conflict-of-laws determinations, the LLC
bears considerable similarities to the corporation.177 The LLC is like a
corporation in that it offers limited liability and continuity of life.178
Furthermore, while an LLC is unlike a corporation in having
decentralized management and limited transferability of interests,
those characteristics are relatively unimportant for purposes of
conflict of laws.179
Second, LLC law suggests that the LLC historically has been
treated like a corporation for purposes of limited liability. An initial
173. Kozyris, supra note 147, at 17-18 (noting that the law of the state of incorporation has
been applied in all but a “handful of cases” over the last twenty-five years).
174. Kozyris, supra note 114, at 568 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-1001 (Michie Supp.
1993); CAL. CORP. CODE § 17,450(a) (West Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 53-650 (1993); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 183-1001 (West Supp. 1994)).
175. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-901(a)(1) (1997).
176. Professor Kozyris described those statutes directing the application of the internal
affairs doctrine to an LLC as “unnecessary” because such directives are “completely consistent
with conflict-of-laws theory and practice.” Kozyris, supra note 114, at 568.
177. Id. at 570 (noting that the “LLC is a hybrid form of a corporation and a partnership”).
178. Id.
179. Id. (“Decentralized management and limited transferability of interests do not appear
to be important characteristics under the conflict-of-laws lens.”). Professor Kozyris also points
out that many closely held corporations have limited transferability of interests and
decentralized management but are nonetheless subject to the internal affairs doctrine. Id.
Interestingly, Professor Kozyris additionally assimilates the LLC to the corporation in
characterizing both as “legal persons,” although, as this Note demonstrates, the LLC is not
necessarily treated as such. Id.
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concern with the LLC was that states that did not recognize the
organizational form of the LLC would construe an LLC as a general
partnership and, accordingly, impose unlimited liability upon the
LLC’s members.180 Thus, at the earlier stages of the development of
LLC law, it was urged that “[c]orporate precedents appear to be the
appropriate analogy for determining whether LLC members are
entitled to limited liability in intrastate and interstate LLC
transactions.”181 Some state statutes specifically provided that the law
of the state of organization would govern member liability.182 Beyond
that, courts and scholars cited the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,
the common law principle of comity, the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
and the Interstate Commerce Clause for the proposition that, in
actions against an LLC in a foreign jurisdiction, the court should treat
the LLC as a corporation and apply the limited-liability provisions of
the LLC’s state of organization.183 This concern might be outdated
now that every state recognizes some type of LLC and might relate
more to the problem of liability to third parties as opposed to
interaction between the members. Given the limited application of
the internal affairs doctrine to issues regarding limited liability, the
strange position in which the modern LLC finds itself—an entity for
liability purposes but apparently not for others, at least not in
Delaware—is not all that surprising. Regardless, the past willingness
to recognize the application of the internal affairs doctrine to the
LLC, even for particular purposes only, and the recognition of
similarities between the corporation and the LLC indicate that the
LLC should merit some protection as an entity.
III. THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF DEMAND
Application of the internal affairs doctrine to an LLC would
suggest that the state of organization has some interest in having
disputes involving the LLC resolved according to its laws.184 This
observation raises the question why the Delaware Supreme Court
seemed comfortable allowing Malek LLC’s affairs to be determined
by arbitrators in California. In support of its view that Malek LLC

180. Id. at 565.
181. Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 456.
182. Id. (noting that the law of the state of organization governs member liability in
Colorado, Kansas, Virginia, and Texas).
183. Id.
184. See supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
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was subject to arbitration in California, the Elf Atochem court cited
numerous Delaware cases that expressed the state’s favorable view of
arbitration;185 the court did not, however, consider whether the
arbitration provisions in question in the cited cases also involved a
choice of forum other than Delaware. In fact, the provisions at issue
in those cases did not contain any express reference to a choice of
forum other than Delaware. Furthermore, the claims brought in Elf
Atochem were arguably within the “internal affairs” of the LLC, and
as such the Delaware Supreme Court conceivably could have insisted
on applying its own law. As Professor Susan Pace Hamill notes, the
LLC’s “earliest origin” stems from “the cementing of state power
over the creation of corporations.”186
Attracting business to the state drove the enactment of LLC
legislation. Wyoming enacted the first LLC legislation in 1977,187 and
Florida followed in 1982.188 The purpose of these initial enactments
was to attract capital into the respective states.189 Since a 1989
announcement by the Internal Revenue Service that a lack of
personal liability would not preclude an entity’s classification as a
partnership for tax purposes,190 the other forty-eight states and the
District of Columbia have each enacted limited liability company
legislation.191
185. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 292 n.34 (1998) (citing SBC
Interactive, Inc. v. Corporate Media Partners, 714 A.2d 758, 761 (Del. 1998); Graham v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 565 A.2d 908, 911 (Del. 1989); Action Drug Co. v. R. Baylin Co., No. 9383, 1989
Del. LEXIS 74, at *3 (Del. Ch. June 19, 1989); Pettinaro Constr. Co. v. Harry C. Partridge, Jr. &
Sons, Inc., 408 A.2d 957, 961-63 (Del. Ch. 1979)).
186. Hamill, supra note 140, at 1462.
187. Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 383.
188. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. 608.401-.471 (West Supp. 1991)).
189. Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 383.
190. Id. at 384 (noting that the announcement stated the Internal Revenue Service’s
intention to treat a Wyoming LLC as a partnership for tax purposes).
191. ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1 to -61 (1999); ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.50.010-.995 (Lexis 1998 &
Supp. 1999); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-601 to -857 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 4-32-101 to -1401 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17,000-17,655
(West Supp. 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-80-101 to -1101 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 34-100 to -299 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1109 (1999);
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1301 to -1375 (1996 & Supp. 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401-.703
(West 1993 & Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-11-100 to -1109 (1994 & Supp. 2000); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 428-101 to -1302 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2000); IDAHO CODE §§ 53-601 to
-672 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 2000); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-1 to 180/60-1 (West Supp.
2000); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-1-1 to -13-1 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2000); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 490A.100-.1601 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to -7709 (1995 &
Supp. 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.001-.455 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1999); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1301-1369 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 601-762
(West 1996 & Supp. 1999); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 4A-101 to -1103 (1999 &
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The driving force behind this recent rise in the number of LLC
statutes was largely a desire to avoid limitations on the single-tax
treatment of S corporations192 while enjoying limited liability.193 Much
of the language of LLC statutes borrows from the law of partnership
and closely held corporations.194 More recently, however, flexibility
has dominated LLC statutes and allowed drafters of LLC agreements
greater rein.195 This flexibility has affected more than just tax
considerations: adherence to principles of freedom of contract now
characterizes much of LLC law.196
Supp. 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156C, §§ 1-68 (1996 & Supp. 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 450.4101-.5200 (West Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 322B.01-.960 (West 1996 &
Supp. 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-29-101 to -1204 (2000); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 347.010-.740
(West Supp. 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-101 to -1307 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 212601 to -2653 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 86.010-86.590 (Michie 1999);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304-C:1 to 304-C:85 (1995 & Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:2B-1
to -70 (West Supp. 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-19-1 to -74 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1999); N.Y.
LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW §§ 101-1403 (McKinney Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57C-1-01 to -1007 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-01 to -156 (1995 & Supp. 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1705.01-.58 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2000-2060 (West 1999 &
Supp. 2000); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 63.001-.990 (Supp. 1998); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 89018998 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-1 to -75 (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 3344-101 to -1207 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-34A-101 to -1207 (Michie
2000); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-201-101 to 48-248-606 (1995 & Supp. 1999); TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, §§ 1.01-11.07 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2000); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 48-2b-101 to -158 (1998 & Supp. 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3001-3162 (1997 & Supp.
2000); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1073 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2000); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 25.15.005-.902 (West Supp. 2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 31B-1-101 to 31B-13-1306
(Michie 1996 & Supp. 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 183.0102-.1305 (West Supp. 1999); WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101 to -144 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2000).
192. Kozyris, supra note 114, at 574.
193. Gazur, supra note 1, at 166.
194. Id. at 135; see also Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 395 (suggesting that “it is important
to compare LLCs with statutory close corporations”). State legislatures presumably believed
that the business relationships for which an LLC is suited resembled those of a partnership or
closely held corporation. Gazur, supra note 1, at 135 (citing Scott R. Anderson, The Illinois
Limited Liability Company: A Flexible Alternative for Business, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 55, 103-04
(1993); Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 395).
195. Gazur, supra note 1, at 143.
196. An LLC agreement or operating agreement is a contract that sets forth provisions for
the operation and governance of the LLC. Delaware, for example, defines a limited liability
company agreement as “any agreement, written or oral, of the member or members as to the
affairs of a limited liability company and the conduct of its business.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 18-101(7) (1999). Virginia similarly defines “operating agreement” as “an agreement of the
members as to the affairs of a limited liability company and the conduct of its business.” VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-1002 (Michie 1999). For other similar definitions of what constitutes an LLC
agreement, see the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT
§ 103(a), 6A U.L.A. 434 (1995) (“[A]ll members of a limited liability company may enter into an
operating agreement . . . to regulate the affairs of the company and the conduct of its business,
and to govern relations among the members, managers, and company.”), the California
Corporate Code, CAL. CORP. CODE § 17,001(ab) (West Supp. 2000) (“‘Operating agreement’
means any agreement, written or oral, between all of the members as to the affairs of a limited
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The Elf Atochem court itself characterized the LLC as “an
attractive vehicle to facilitate business relationships and
transactions.”197 The Elf Atochem decision raises the issue as to what
effect enforcing choice-of-forum provisions in an LLC agreement—
and what effect doing so when the LLC is not expressly a party to the
agreement—will have on the attractiveness of forming an LLC in a
particular state. For example, a court could construe Elf Atochem as
allowing an arbitration award to be enforced against a defendant LLC
that was not a party to an arbitration agreement in a dispute that was
submitted to arbitration over the LLC’s objections. Such a policy
might discourage the formation of an LLC in a particular state.
In advocating the enforcement of contractual choice-of-law
provisions generally, Professor Ribstein has postulated that
permitting parties to choose the governing law gives states an
incentive to compete for legal business.198 The competition for legal
business influences states to develop new laws to attract new business
and revise laws to retain business, which in turn leads to efficient legal
rules.199 Both a state and interest groups within it can benefit from
having efficient legal rules such as the kind spurred by competition;200
in particular, a state can increase its revenue if enforcing choice-oflaw provisions attracts business to the state or allows the state to
collect a fee for contracts that choose the state’s law.201
Of course, this argument addresses whether parties would choose
a state’s law in the first place, not whether a state’s tendency to
enforce choice-of-law provisions makes it competitive. Interestingly,
however, Professor Ribstein cites the development of LLC laws as
evidence of the potential beneficial effect of jurisdictional
competition; more recent statutes, for example, allow greater
flexibility in an LLC agreement’s provisions for continuing the firm
after dissociation and on transferring interests.202 While Professor
Ribstein admits that the development of LLC law might have
occurred without enforcing contractual choice of law because most
liability company and the conduct of its business . . . .”), and the New York Limited Liability
Company Law, N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 102(u) (McKinney Supp. 2000) (“‘Operating
agreement’ means any written agreement of the members concerning the business of a limited
liability company and the conduct of its affairs . . . .”).
197. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 287 (Del. 1999).
198. Ribstein, supra note 77, at 249.
199. Id. at 249-50.
200. Id. at 259-60.
201. Id. at 259.
202. Id. at 250.
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LLCs are organized under the state where their business is located,203
he argues that the rapidity of its development “is a sign that
legislatures and bar groups acted at least to some extent in response
to potential competition from other states.”204
Competition among states for LLCs is still certainly possible. As
of yet, no state has strongly drawn interstate LLCs the way Delaware
has attracted corporations.205 Nonetheless, to the extent that the
differences among states in the degree of freedom given to parties to
fashion their own arrangement are important to those organizing
LLCs, those differences will most likely create preferences among
states.206 Furthermore, many legislators and LLC promoters at the
state level perceive their LLC statutes as attracting and keeping
business and investment in their particular state.207 This pressure
contributes to the multistate contest for LLC business.208
In the face of this competition, Delaware is potentially
preeminent.209 “Already a forum of choice when it comes to
organizing corporations, limited partnerships and business trusts, the
state [Delaware] intends to achieve a comparable position” for
LLCs.210 In less than a decade, over 100,000 LLCs have been formed
in Delaware, in contrast to approximately 290,000 corporations.211 The
flexibility of the Delaware statute contributes to Delaware’s potential
preeminence in that it makes Delaware LLCs amenable to the
“special tailoring” that is often needed for complex business
organizations.212 In addition, Delaware has sought to facilitate the
transfer of non-Delaware organizations into Delaware by allowing
them to domesticate as, or convert into, Delaware LLCs without
having to go through a merger.213
203. Id.; see also Kozyris, supra note 114, at 567-68 (contrasting the LLC statutes of different
states).
204. Ribstein, supra note 77, at 250.
205. Kozyris, supra note 114, at 567-68.
206. Gazur, supra note 1, at 147.
207. Id. at 179.
208. Id.
209. See Kozyris, supra note 114, at 567.
210. Leyden, supra note 97, at 51.
211. Id. IRS statistics indicate that, in 1997, there were some 4,787,000 corporations filing
returns nationwide. Number of Business Income Tax Returns, by Size of Business for Specified
Income Years, 1980-1997, http://www.irs.gov/prod/tax_stats/soi/other_nr.html (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
212. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 53, § 14.01[1].
213. Id. § 14.01[1] n.4. Sections 18-212 and 18-214 provide for the domestication or
conversion of organizations from non–United States jurisdictions and other state jurisdictions,
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The Delaware LLC Act was once characterized as “designed to
preserve the primacy of Delaware judges in interpreting and making
Delaware LLC law.”214 The support for this statement came in part
from section 18-109 of the Act, which provides:
In a written limited liability company agreement or other
writing, a manager or member may consent to be subject to
the nonexclusive jurisdiction of the courts of, or arbitration in,
a specified jurisdiction, or the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of the State of Delaware, or the exclusivity of
arbitration in a specified jurisdiction of the State of
Delaware . . . .215
In arguing that the Delaware statute was drafted to promote the
preeminence of Delaware in LLC law, Professors Ribstein and
Keatinge interpreted this section as allowing parties to agree to
exclusive jurisdiction only in the courts of Delaware.216 The
Elf Atochem court, however, interpreted this section somewhat
differently, stating the statute does not expressly prohibit the parties
from vesting exclusive jurisdiction in court proceedings in another
jurisdiction.217 Another plausible argument is that, because the
Delaware General Assembly specifically allowed for the exclusive
vesting of jurisdiction in Delaware courts while only providing for
nonexclusive jurisdiction in non-Delaware courts, it did not intend to

respectively.
214. Id. § 14.01[1] n.4. In discussing the role of Delaware courts in LLC law, James G.
Leyden, Jr. has noted that, “The Court of Chancery and the Supreme Court are the same courts
that often handle Delaware corporate, limited partnership and business trust litigation and have
substantial experience in resolving business disputes.” Leyden, supra note 97, at 63. He goes on
to offer a possible insight into another reason why a Delaware court might enforce an operating
agreement against a nonparty LLC:
The Delaware courts have recognized, for example, that many partnership
agreements are drafted by sophisticated commercial lawyers and the Delaware courts
attempt to give effect to the words used in the partnership agreement. It is likely that
Delaware courts will take a similar view when interpreting DLLC agreements and the
rights and duties of members and managers.
Id.
215. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-109(d) (West 2000).
216. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 53, § 14.01[1]. At the time of Ribstein and
Keatinge’s publication, section 18-109 read, “[i]n a written limited liability company agreement
or other writing, a manager or member may consent to be subject to the nonexclusive
jurisdiction of the courts of, or arbitration in, a specified jurisdiction, or the exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts of, or the exclusivity of arbitration in, the State of Delaware . . . .”
Thus, Ribstein and Keatinge’s statement should be revised to read that parties may agree to the
jurisdiction of courts only in Delaware but of arbitration in any jurisdiction.
217. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 296 (Del. 1999).
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permit vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of another
jurisdiction. In promoting freedom of contract in LLC agreements,
perhaps in an attempt to make Delaware attractive for organizers of
LLCs, the Elf Atochem decision might actually have sacrificed some
of the control the state can exercise over LLCs. The Elf Atochem
opinion could be construed as suggesting that a state does not have a
paramount interest in the operation of its LLCs: first, because it
intimates that an LLC is not an entity in which the state necessarily
has an interest, and, second, because it permits issues concerning its
LLCs to be resolved in another forum.218
CONCLUSION
Freedom of contract offers a business entity flexibility in
organizing its structure and conducting its affairs. Arbitration policy
now gives arbitration agreements equal footing with other contracts.
These principles notwithstanding, the enforceability of an arbitration
agreement against a party requires a preliminary determination that
the party is in fact a party to the agreement.
This determination becomes complicated when the party in
question is an LLC. The LLC is an amalgam of partnership and
corporate characteristics. As such, a court could arguably treat the
LLC as a conglomeration of its members, like a partnership. In this
case, all of the members could bind the LLC to their own agreement
to arbitrate. Application of the conflicts of laws principles governing
partnerships in fact suggests that an LLC should not expect to have its
disputes resolved in courts of its state of formation.
A court could treat the LLC as an independent entity, like a
corporation. Application of the citizenship and internal affairs
doctrines used in corporations law indicates that freedom of contract
does not necessarily justify enforcing a contract to which an LLC is
not a party against it. Citizenship analysis indicates that treating an
LLC in the same way as a corporation for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction is within the power of the legislature. To the extent that
an LLC is like a corporation, it could benefit from the principles
expressed in the internal affairs doctrine, which explicitly recognizes
that the state of formation has an important interest in having its
218. James G. Leyden, Jr. has noted that the majority of Delaware LLCs do not conduct
business in the state and have no assets or activities there other than the required maintenance
of a registered agent and office but are formed in Delaware to benefit from the state’s laws and
courts. Leyden, supra note 97, at 63.
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courts resolve issues affecting the corporation. LLC legislation grew
out of state legislatures’ desire to attract business to their respective
states. A willingness to bind an LLC to an agreement to which it is
not a party, however, might counter the attraction offered by a form
of business association as flexible as the LLC. In this respect,
enforcing such contracts could harm not only the LLC but also the
state that enforces them.

